

УДК: 930(477)

UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH IN GALICIA (HALYCHYNA): THE CREATION, THE BAN, AND THE RESURRECTION. GENERAL OVERVIEW

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The author presents a short description of the religious situation in Eastern Galicia from the times of creation of the Uniate Church up to our days. Particular attention is paid to the times of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, activities of Ukrainian Catholic Church underground and religious renaissance in Lviv Region after 1989, especially after Ukraine regained independence.

Key words: Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Lviv Region, religion, church, confessions (denominations), Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO).

For the past few decades the religious situation in Ukraine has been a point of interest of a wide circle of researchers¹. The main reason for this is the special role of the church in the social and political life of Ukrainian lands since the Baptism of Rus in 988. Even in times of the Soviet Union, when any forms of religious life were being suppressed, about 65% (sic!) of all parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)² were located here. Moreover, independent Ukraine has one of the highest indices of the nation's religiosity in Europe. A long time research of the *Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine that was being conducted since 1992, shows that right now church has the highest trust of Ukrainians among all other state and social institutions (about 73% of respondents)*³.

At the same time, unlike in the neighbouring Poland, for a few centuries the Church in Ukraine, especially the Orthodox one, has remained aside from the processes related to the creation of Ukrainian state and nation. Moreover, in times when Ukrainian lands were a part of the Romanov Empire and USSR, the clerics of ROC often took a clearly anti-Ukrainian position to please their leadership, for example by anathematizing hetman Ivan Mazepa or breaking the principles of the seal of confession by giving up the representatives of the national liberation movement to the state security services⁴.

¹ For details see: Marchuk V. *Cerkva, duchovnist, naciya. Ukrainska hreko-katolycka tserkva v suspilnomu zhytti Ukrainy XX st.*, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2004, more: *Relihiya ta tserkva v Ukraini. Bibliohrafichnyy pokazhchyk. Uporiadnyk M. Batih*, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2012

² See: Kochan N. I. *Ekumenizm: pryroda yavlyshcha i sutnist poniattia*, 1996, <http://library.khpg.org/index.php?id=1210631391>

³ See: Oleksiyenko O. *Relihiyna palitra Ukrainy*. 2014, <http://tyzhden.ua/Society/107903>

⁴ *Malenka lektsiya dla Halahana pro tserkovnyy provid*, <http://maidan.org.ua/arch/oldrel/1054678423.html>

The situation started to change in 1985 in times of the so-called Perestroika or reformation within the Soviet Union. During the Gorbachev liberalization of the socio-political life, religious societies, especially in Western Ukraine, started to liberate from the influence of the almighty KGB and gradually renew Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (from the 30th of November 1989), and later on Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC, Kyiv Council on June 5-6 1990)⁵. A bit later (June 1992) after two groups that fought for the independence from ROC united, a Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) was created⁶.

After the declaration of independence of Ukraine, the state policy towards churches and various religious organizations was de jure based on the principle of equality of religions and religious organizations that exist in the country, as well as the policy of non-intervention⁷. But soon enough (probably led by the example of Greece) the approach was changed as the state was trying to build a special relationship with certain religious organizations that played an important role for Ukraine and its society according to the country's political leaders⁸.

Therefore since the beginning of the XXI century there have been both attempts of obvious politicization Ukraine as well as greater influence of the church on politics. Especially in times of the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko the state has actively supported the creation of a United Orthodox Church in Ukraine without taking into account the position of the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and the situation in Orthodoxy worldwide. However after the elections in 2010 the newly elected president Viktor Yanukovich took the course on the model that currently functioned in Russia⁹. This meant breaking the partnership between the church and the state, and following the principle of equality of all the churches and religious organizations, and clearly favorizing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP)¹⁰.

⁵ Див.: *Istoriya khrystyjanskoyi tserkvy na Ukraini. Relihiyevnavchyy narys*, Kyiv, 1992, p. 51; 79

⁶ Див.: *Ukrainska pravoslavna tserkva Kyivskoho patriarkhatu*, https://uk.wikipedia.org/wiki/Українська_православна_церква_Київського_патріархату

⁷ Politics and religion in Ukraine usually come to accommodation, i.e. mutual understanding without causing each other problems. Nevertheless, in times of political confrontations (2004–2005 and 2013–2014), there were numerous examples of sharp disputes between certain political organizations and state structures (for more details see: *Religia i polityka. Zarys problematyki*, redakcja naukowa Piotr Burgoński i Michał Gierycz, Warszawa 2014, s. 233–236)

⁸ Rosenko M. *Derzhavna polityka Ukrainy shchodo tserkvy j relihiynykh orhanizatsiy. Yikhnie mistse v politychniy systemi suspilstva*. 2009, <http://www.viche.info/journal/1513/>

⁹ Russian Orthodox Church is practically a state church in Russia (see: *Hosudarstvo zaihyvayet s tserkovyu. 24 yanvaria 2011 h.*, <http://www.rosbalt.ru>)

¹⁰ See: *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini: pidsumky desiatylittia, tendencyi i problemy*, Natsionalna bezpeka i oborona, 2011, nr 1–2, p. 77. According to a prominent religionist Viktor Yelensky, in 2010–2011 Viktor Yanukovich was trying to create one main church by forcing the communities of UOC-KP to switch to the UOC-MP. But this strategy failed (Viktor Yelensky: *“Relihiya povertayetsia v ukrayinsku polityku, ale tse ne oznachaye, sheho vona zyednuyetsia z narodnym zhyttiam”*, <http://tyzhden.ua/Society/96855>)

The situation got back into the legal framework defined by the Constitution of Ukraine¹¹, the the Law of Ukraine On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations¹² and a variety of other legislative acts¹³ after Yanukovych and his companions were discharged. It also should be noted that the representatives of clergy of all major Ukrainian churches and religious organizations, except for the UOC-MP, actively participated in the Revolution of Dignity that took place in Kyiv as well as in other cities and regions of Ukraine in autumn 2013 – winter 2014, on the side of the opposition. Nevertheless, along with the leaders of all major churches and religious associations, its representatives were invited to the inauguration of the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko¹⁴. Remarkably, Poroshenko was blessed by all Ukrainian hierarchs, just like President Kuchma, while his predecessor Viktor Yanukovych was inaugurated in Kyiv Pechersk Lavra by a foreign hierarch – Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus Kirill, in the presence of hierarchs of UOC-MP only¹⁵.

At the moment the religious environment in Ukraine is quite diverse. According to an American sociologist José Casanova, Ukraine boasts the most diverse religious market in Eastern Europe¹⁶. Depending on the region, it is clearly dominated by three Orthodox, two Catholic and three Protestant churches along with some new religious movements. The indicators of declared religiosity of the citizens of Ukraine are also growing, mostly in the regions where they were relatively low before: in the South, Centre and East of Ukraine¹⁷. But in spite of remarkable growth in these regions, the

¹¹ *Pro pryyniattia Konstytutsiyi i vvedennia yiyi v diyu: Zakon Ukrainy vid 28.06.1996 N 254/96-VR, Zakonodavcha baza VRU, www.rada.gov.ua*

¹² *Pro svobodu sovisti ta relihiyni orhanizatsiyi: Zakon URSR vid 23.04.1991 № 987–XII, Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady, 1991, nr 25, p. 283*

¹³ Constitution of Ukraine guarantees freedom of conscience to its citizens. Everyone has a right to freedom of worldview and religion. This right includes freedom to profess any religion, or do not profess any religion, freedom of religious practices and rituals in groups and individually, and freedom of religious activity. This right may be restricted by law only in the interests of protection of public order, health, and morality of the population or protection of rights and freedoms of others. Church and religious organizations in Ukraine are separated from the state, and school is separated from church. No religion may be recognized by the state as obligatory (see: *Konstytutsiya Ukrainy. Normatyvni dokumenty z urakhuvanniam ostannikh zmin v redaktsiyi stanom na 28.03.2011 r.*, Sumy 2011, p. 10).

¹⁴ Petro Poroshenko: *Povnovazhen i rishuchosti ne zabrakne!*, <http://volga.lutsk.ua/view/3934/2/>

¹⁵ *NG: Ukraina ne votchyna Rosii*, http://news.bigmir.net/world_about_us/248488

¹⁶ José Casanova. *Incipient Religious Denominationalism in Ukraine and Its Effect on Ukrainian-Russian Relations*, Harriman Review, 199, vol. 40, p. 9. As of the 1st of January 2010 there were 55 denominations in Ukraine (comparing to 52 in 2000) and at the moment there are almost 100 (98 to be precise) (see: *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesijni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 3; *Ministerstvo kultury Ukrainy. Zvit pro merezhu relihiynych orhanizatsiy v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 2016 r.*).

¹⁷ Ukraine has a number one position in Europe, when it comes to the number of people who became religious in the past twenty years (see: *Ukraina – yedyna krayina v Yevropi, de usi relihiyi mayut rivni prava i konkuruyut odna z odnoyu*, http://www.irs.in.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1253%3A1&catid=62%3Ainterv&Itemid=85&lang=uk)

prevalence of Western Ukraine remains significant – 71% and 89%¹⁸. It is also worth mentioning that this difference is even more noticeable when it comes to daily religious practice.

Why Western Ukraine?

Since the very beginning of its existence Ukrainian church was much more tolerant and open to the external influences than, for example, the Moscow one. One of the reasons was its long coexistence with the Catholic and Protestant churches in multiethnic Rzeczpospolita (until 1686¹⁹). The idea of tolerance towards different religions entered Ukraine together with the Protestantism. It was the Reformation that “impregnated Ukrainian spiritual life with the ideas of religious tolerance and freedom of conscience”²⁰. The brightest example of the willingness of Ukrainians to return to the Pan-European civilizational approach, was the creation of the so called Uniate (presently Greek Catholic) church, that kept the Eastern rite, recognizing authority of Pope (Brest, 1596)²¹.

The main initiators of the Union of Brest in 1596 were not Galician bishops, but the ones of Volyn and Kyiv – the bishop of Lutsk, Pinsk and Holm as well as metropolitan Mykhaylo Rohoza²². Moreover, the eparchy of Przemyśl only joined the Union with Rome in 1691, the eparchy of Lviv – in 1700, and The Stauropagic Brotherhood of Lviv only joined in 1708²³.

Nevertheless in 19th–20th centuries by the will of Nemesis Uniate Church became a truly national church of the Galician Ukrainians saving them from complete denationalization, saving the ancient rite, language, and cultural values²⁴. The Uniate Church started to play a considerably more important role in Eastern Galicia (currently Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions) when it joined the Habsburg Monarchy in 1772 and the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was created. Already in 1774 the

¹⁸ *Cerkovno-relihiyna sytuaciya³ derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukrayini...*, p. 60.

¹⁹ In 1686 Kyiv ecclesiastical province was transferred to the canonical jurisdiction of Moscow patriarchate. In 1772 Kyiv church lost the status of the ecclesiastical province as well as its independence and selfhood. But even then there was barely any religious intolerance in Ukraine (see: *Svoboda sovisti v istoriyi Ukrainy*, <http://readbookz.com/book/164/4848.html>)

²⁰ *Дуб.*: *Relihiyi v Ukraini. Ukrainskyi konfesiynny pluralizm*, <http://www.horting.org.ua/node/1484>)

²¹ Szyszlak T. *Lwowskie sacrum, kijowskie profanum. Grekokatolicyzm w ukraińskiej przestrzeni publicznej od pierestrojki do pomarańczowej rewolucji*, Warszawa, 2012, s. 58–59

²² The bishop of Lviv Hedeon Balaban supported the idea of a union between the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches at first, but then on the 1st of July, after he made peace with the The Stauropagic Brotherhood, he opposed it. A year later, together with the bishop of Przemyśl Mykhail Kopystensky he participated in the Orthodox “spiritual circle” in Brest (see. *Istoriya khrystyjanskoyi tserkvy...*, p. 30–31)

²³ *Ibidem.*, p. 34

²⁴ See: Sapelak A. *Kyivska tserkva na slovyanskomu shodi. Kanonichno-ekumenichnyj aspekt*, Buenos Aires-Lviv, 1999, p. 160–161

Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa changed the name of the church into Greek Catholic, the way it is called nowadays. At the same time, due to the reforms Greek Catholic priests gained the rights comparable to those of the Roman Catholic ones. The same year Maria Theresa founded the very first Greek Catholic seminary Barbareum (connected to the St Barbara Church in Vienna) and in 1783 on the initiative of the Emperor Joseph II²⁵ a General Greek Catholic Seminary was founded in Lviv.

Moreover, while Russian authorities suppressed Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church in 1795, Austrian government facilitated transformation of Galician Greek Catholic Eparchy into Galician Greek Catholic Metropolis in 1808. Antin Anhelovych became the first Greek Catholic metropolitan. Since that time Lviv became a residence of three metropolitans (archbishops) – the Greek Catholic, Armenian, and the Roman Catholic one. It was another display of constant coexistence of various Christian confessions in this territory²⁶.

Due to the reforms carried out by the Austrian Government, Greek Catholic clergy gained a leading position in Galicia, which was further extremely important for the national revival.²⁷ After a few centuries as a part of Rzeczpospolita, Galician Rusyns lost their political, economical, and cultural elites. When Galicia became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was represented only by two strata – peasants and priests, as Polish used to say²⁸. Thanks to the liberal Austrian rule in the first half of the 19th century a number of worldly intellectuals came from the Greek Catholic clergy, among others prominent lawyers, doctors, journalists, writers, and scientists. Beginning with the so to say “autonomous” period in the social life of Galicia²⁹, they became politicians who not only formed national consciousness among the peasant masses, but also led Ukrainian national movement to get the rights equal to those of Polish population³⁰.

²⁵ For details see: Grünberg K., Sprengel B. *Trudne sąsiedztwo. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w X–XX wieku*, Warszawa, 2005, s. 149–152; Wilson A. *Ukraińcy*, Warszawa, 2002, s. 101–103

²⁶ See: Sapelyak A. *Kyivska tserkva na slovyanskomu skhodi...*, № 95; Pashuk A. *Ukrainska Tserkva i nezalezhnist Ukrainy*, Lviv 2003, p. 197–199, 205. A prominent Ukrainian writer Bohdan Lepky mentioned peaceful coexistence of three abovementioned Catholic confessions, particularly in the town of Berezhany in Ternopil region at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Among others, every year, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic and Armenian priests celebrated Epiphany by serving a solemn mass in the main square. They were usually joined by representatives by the local authorities, elites, and common citizens, regardless of religious affiliation. Nowadays Epiphany is celebrated as a big religious holiday only by Greek Catholics (see: Lepky B. *Tvory u dvoch tomah. Tom 2. Povisti, spohady, vystupy*, Kyiv 1991, p. 526–527).

²⁷ See: Vulpius R. *Relihiya ta natsiya: uniyna tserkva, pravoslavyya ta «derzhava-protektor Rosiyya», Ukraina. Protsey natsiotvorennia*. Uporyadnyk Andreas Kappeler, Kyiv, 2011, p. 98–99. This environment shaped the personalities of the first enlighteners (Ivan Mohylnytsky, Ivan Snihursky, Iosyp Lozynsky, Ivan Lavrivsky et. al.) and “awakeners” of the Galician Ukrainians – Markiyani Shashkebych, Ivan Vahylevych and Yakiv Holovatsky ((Doroshenko D. I. *Narys istoriyi Ukrainy*, Lviv, 1991, p. 529–530).

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Since 1873 Galicia was *de facto* an autonomic province of Austro-Hungary

³⁰ See: Yekelchik S. *Ukraina. Narodzyny nowoczesnego narodu*, Kraków, 2009, s. 63–65.

Until 1860-ies the representatives of clergy were the one and only leaders of Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, and major popularisers of Ukrainian national idea among peasants until 1890-ies.

However, after the defeat of revolution in the Austrian Empire in 1848, for the next few decades Russophile disposition prevailed among Greek Catholic clergy, especially the eminences. The main reason for it was the policy of Vienna which caused raise in Polish influence on the Crown Land. Only in the last two decades of the 19th century, as Russia began to lead an active expansionist policy towards all Slavic countries, both Austrian Government and Vatican had to support Galician Ukrainians in their fight against pro-Russian moods. Along with the changes in policy towards Eastern Galicia, came the reforms in the Greek Catholic church, carried out by Vatican. A few pro-Russian hierarchs were replaced and high representatives of the Greek Catholic church started to engage more into Ukrainian matters³¹.

The Age of Metropolitan Sheptytsky

Nomination of Andrey Sheptytsky as a Metropolitan of Galicia on the 17th of December 1900 was a final turning point for the national self identification of Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy. Sheptytsky was inaugurated on the 17th of January 1901 in St George Cathedral in Lviv. Metropolitan Andrey served Ukrainian people as a head of the Greek Catholic church until he died on the 1st of November 1944³².

According to a Russian Catholic priest Nikolai Trage, one of the most important achievements of Sheptytsky was a reform in theological education which enabled qualifying highly educated and nationally conscious priests who enjoyed deep trust and respect among the peasants. The vast majority of them became moral authorities and leaders of social life, opening up *Prosvita* reading halls in villages, various economic and financial clubs, leading anti-alcoholic campaigns etc. Additionally, the introduction of the actual Rus (Ukrainian) language drew the priests together with the flock even more³³.

Sheptytsky's work as a leader of Greek Catholic church, stirred Ukrainian national movement to activity. As a Metropolitan of Galicia, Sheptytsky was a Member of the Parliament in Vienna and a Member of Galician Sejm. Probably one of the greatest achievements of Sheptytsky were the arrangements with the Polish in 1914 regarding election reform that was supposed to provide more Ukrainian representatives to the Galician Sejm and opening of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. Unfortunately the implementation of these arrangements was prevented by war.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 70.

³² See: Sapelak A. *Kyyivska tserkva na slovyanskomu shodi. Kanonichno-ekumenichnyj aspekt*, Buenos Aires-Lviv, 1999, p. 111, 169

³³ See: *Spohady Mykolaya Trage pro joho perebuvannia v Halychyni u 1908–1913 rr. (1915–1916)*, Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytsky i hreko-katolyky v Rosiyi. Knyha 1. Dokumenty i materiyaly, 1899–1917. Uporiadkuvaly Yuriy Avvakumov i Oksana Hayova, Lviv, 2004, p. 838; 840; 842; 843.

Being one of the richest men in Galicia, metropolitan Sheptytsky loved the Ukrainian idea “to the depth of his pocket”³⁴, as Evhen Chykalenko once said metaphorically. He generously sponsored Ukrainian cultural and educational societies and provided scholarships to young artists. In 1905 he founded a National Museum in Lviv and bought a lot of exhibits for it. He supported various Ukrainian economic activities and initiatives, helped open cooperatives and hospitals. Among others, he sponsored the setup of a so called Public Hospital not far from St George Church. He further founded a classic gymnasium in Lviv and financed Ukrainian private schooling. All this facilitated the increase of credibility of the Greek Catholic Church in Eastern Galician society and further turned into the national church of Ukraine³⁵.

The abovementioned were the reasons of the arrest of the Metropolitan during the occupation of Lviv by the Russian army in 1914. In the eyes of the Russian command metropolitan Sheptytsky along with the Greek Catholic dignitaries, were “the true leaders of Ukrainian national liberation movement in Galicia”³⁶. On the 19th of September 1914 Andrey Sheptytsky was arrested and deported to Russia. Later on he was joined by bishops Botsyan and Yaremko, rector of the Theological Seminary of Stanislaviv Evhen Lomnytsky and over 30 other priests³⁷.

Russian occupational authorities were willing to destroy the Greek Catholic Church and convert its believers into Orthodoxy. The ‘orthodox campaign’ was entrusted to Yevlohy, the archbishop of Volyn. His plans were supposed to be carried out by the priests, invited from Poltava, Kharkiv, Chelm and other eparchies. These Orthodox priests though have not gained trust of Galician parishioners. One of the main reasons was that they were quite immoral and uneducated comparing to the Greek Catholic priests. In 9 months of Russian occupational rule in Eastern Galicia only 86 out of 1873 Greek Catholic parishes became fully Orthodox, which was about 4,5%, so it clearly was not a mass phenomenon³⁸.

It is worth mentioning, that after coming back from Russia to Lviv, Metropolitan Andrey treated the hierarchs of ROC Antoni Khrapovytsky and Yevlogi Georgievsky, who had been arrested by the Polish government in Spring of 1919 like a true Christian. Not only did he agree to receive them in his palace, but also pled with the Polish administration for their release. The approach of Metropolitan Andrey to the Orthodox hierarchs compels even more respect, for he himself and his Church both undoubtedly suffered from one of them³⁹.

³⁴ See: Yevhen Chykalenko. *Shchodennyk (1907–1917)*, Lviv, 1931, p. 71.

³⁵ See: Khymska I.-P. *Relihiya i natsionalnist na Ukrayini. II polovyna XVIII–XX stolittia, Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine. The foundations of historiānal and cultural traditions in East Central Europe*, Lublin, 1994, p. 203–206.

³⁶ See: Baran S. *Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytskyy. Zhyttia i diyalnist*, München, 1947, p. 55.

³⁷ See: Kuchera I. *Polityka rosiys'koyi okupatsiynoyi administratsiyyi v Schidniy Halychyni u 1914–1917 rr.*, <http://www.pu.if.ua/depart/SlavsHistory/resource/file/Kuczera%20I..doc>

³⁸ *Ibidem*; *Spohady Mykolaya Trage...*, p. 843

³⁹ See: Zhukovsky A. *Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytsky i pravoslavyya*, <http://national.org.ua/library/sheptyckyj.html>.

In the interwar period Andrey Sheptytsky was in the opposition to the reborn Polish State due to its anti-Ukrainian policy. He actively developed the Greek Catholic Church⁴⁰, actively defended the civil rights of his parishioners, and was in resolute opposition to the Polonisation of Ukraine and discrimination of Ukrainian schooling. In 1930 he firmly condemned the repressions of the Polish government against Ukrainian social, educational, and cultural societies, the so-called pacification; the Great Famine (Holodomor) in Soviet Ukraine in 1933, and destruction of Orthodox holy places in Chelm and Pidlyashshia regions⁴¹. He also did a lot of good for cooperative movement, healthcare, agriculture, and banking. He supported educational work with youth, founded Plast (Ukrainian scout) camps, took care of orphanages and sent presents for Pesach to poor Jewish children⁴².

A life-long work of Metropolitan Andrey as a church leader, benefactor, and philanthropist, clearly controverts his pseudo-image of a “spiritual leader of Ukrainian nationalists⁴³. As a politic and social activist, Metropolitan always followed the Christian principles, such as “love of the neighbour” and “you shall not murder”. For this, he often had conflicts with the radical part of the Ukrainian society of Eastern Galicia. This was also the case when Metropolitan condemned the actions of Myroslav Sichynsky, who killed the Governor of Galicia of Earl Andrzej Potocki⁴⁴.

In 1920–1930-ies due to his Christian position, humanitarian metropolitan was still in an ambiguous position. Just like in the XIX century, the church he led was a very important factor in Ukrainian national movement and many of its leaders came out

⁴⁰ In the interwar period Andrey Sheptytsky initiated the establishment of a Greek Catholic Academy (1928), Theological Scientific Society (1929), and Metropolitan Rutsky Ukrainian Catholic Institute of Church Unity (1939). Continuing his activities to support the Union, he renewed operation of the Dutch Greek Catholic Apostolate in Belgium – the Eastern branch of the Benedictine Order and initiated the Uniate movement in England. By 1939 Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church counted 3040 parishes, 4440 churches, a Theological Academy, five Theological Seminaries, two schools, and 127 monasteries. It had about 5 mln of believers under its influence. Ten bishops and 2950 priests were subordinate to the Metropolitan (see: Reyent O. P., Lysenko O. J. *Ukrajinska natsionalna ideya i khrystyianstvo*, Kyiv, 1997, s. 95; *Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytsky – yepyskop Ukrajinskoyi Hreko-Katolytskoyi Tserkvy. Mytropolyt Halytsky ta Arkhyepyskop Lvivsky. Predstoyatel Ukrajinskoyi Hreko-Katolytskoyi Tserkvy*, http://teleoblast.io.ua/s122782/mitropolit_andrey_sheptickiy)

⁴¹ On the 16th of July 1938 Metropolitan Andrey was the only (sic!) Catholic hierarch who issued a pastoral letter in protest to the acts of vandalism in Poland and presented his condolences with the Orthodox Ukrainians (*Ibidem*)

⁴² Metropolitan Sheptytsky spent about a million USD on the orphanages only (see: *Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytsky (29 lypnia 1865 – 1 lystopada 1944)*, <http://fastiv-region.gov.ua/content/ukra%D1%97na-v%D1%96dznacha%D1%94-150-r%D1%96chchya-v%D1%96d-dnyanarodzhennya-mitropolita-galitskogo-andreya-sheptit>)

⁴³ See e.g.: *Ks. Isakowicz-Zaleski o Oredziu Wołyńskiej Rady Kościołów: Cerkiew grecko-katolicka jest współodpowiedzialna za ludobójstwo na Wołyniu*, <http://www.frona.pl/a/ks-isakowicz-zaleski-o-oredziu-woylńskiej-rady-kosciolow-cerkiew-grecko-katolicka-jest-wspolodpowiedzialna-za-ludobojstwo-na-woylniu,27826.html>; *Marian Kaluski: Ukrainiec wrogiem Polaka*, <http://wirtualnapolonia.com/2014/08/22/marian-kaluski-ukrainiec-wrogiem-polaka/>.

⁴⁴ See: Grünberg K., Sprengel B. *Trudne sąsiedztwo...*, s. 197–198

from among Greek Catholic clergy. The priests were leading figures in many Ukrainian non-governmental and political organizations. For example father Leontiy Kunytsky was a member of the central committee of Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), father Mykhailo Blozovsky was in the leadership of the Front of National Unity (FJN) etc.⁴⁵. Therefore the church and the national movement were mostly very close when it came to ideological principles.

But there were also some contractions between the Greek Catholic Church and the national movement. The reason for that was the fact that Andrey Sheptytsky and other archbishops were resolutely against any conspiratorial and especially terroristic activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), finding it “harmful and dangerous”⁴⁶. Nevertheless, a great number of Greek Catholic priests actually shared the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism and supported OUN. Moreover, influenced by the nationalistic ideas some of them took an open anti-government position towards Second Polish Republic⁴⁷. It was not a coincidence, that the younger generation of OUN leaders was first and foremost the sons of Greek Catholic priests – Stepan Bandera, Stepan Okhrimovych, and Stepan Lenkavsky. These young nationalists were the ones criticized by the Metropolitan for their “lack of tolerance”. He also dispraised the expropriation of state and private money by the members of OUN, misappropriation of goods, and especially political murders. To Metropolitan’s opinion such actions contradicted the Christian moral principles⁴⁸.

Therefore, such consecutive humanism of Andrey Sheptytsky caused an open conflict between him and the leadership of the radical wing of Ukrainian national movement UVO-OUN, especially Yevhen Konovalts⁴⁹.

Metropolitan Andrey has not changed his views even during the Second World War. Even though he supported the Act of Renewal of Ukrainian State on the 30th of June 1941, declared by the Bandera fraction of OUN⁵⁰, but he firmly condemned both the fratricidal war between the supporters of Bandera and Melnyk, and participation of Ukrainians punitive actions against Jewish, Polish, and other civilians.

⁴⁵ See: Shendiuch P. *Terorystychna diyalnist natsionalno-vyzvolnoho rukhu u Schidniy Halychyni v mizhvoyenny period: teoriya ta praktyka*, http://cdvr.org.ua/sites/default/files/statti_konkurs/Shendyuh_stattya.pdf

⁴⁶ Hentosh L. *Mytropolyt Sheptytsky. 1923–1939. Vyprovuvannia idealiv*, Lviv, 2015, p. 159, 161

⁴⁷ Thus, from 1931 to 1935, six Greek Catholic priests were arrested and convicted guilty of “disrespect to the Polish government, administration, military, and Polish people”. Nevertheless it is very hard to estimate to what extent the ideas of integral nationalism were spread among the Greek Catholic clergy. Very likely, most of them did not support the activities of OUN and their ideas of the Church being subordinate to the state institutions (see: *Ibidem*, p.141)

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 160, 163

⁴⁹ For details see: *Ibidem*, p.159–185

⁵⁰ See: Marchuk V. *Hreko-katolytska tserkva v umovach nimetskoho ta radianskoho totalitaryzmu (1941–1946 rr.)*, Halychyna, 2000, vyp. 4, p. 66–67; Idem, *Vijna i khrystyianska moral: suspilna misiya hreko-katolytskoji tserkvy u 40-i roky XX st.*, Ukrainka Povstanska Armiya – fenomen natsionalnoyi istoriyi: mater. Vseukr. nauk. konf., Ivano-Frankivsk, 2003, p. 107–117; Reyent O. *UHKC i vyzvolny rukh ukrainskoho narodu*, Istoriya Ukrainy, 1998, no 4, p. 1–2

On the 21st of November 1942, Metropolitan issued a pastoral letter *You Shall Not Murder* in which he wrote int. al.: “It is strange how some people fool themselves and others, not seeing a political murder as a sin, as if politics freed someone from the law of God and justified a crime. It is not so... Someone who sheds innocent blood of their political rival is just as much a murderer, as someone who does it for robbery, and therefore deserves to be punished by God and cursed by the Church”⁵¹.

When the war between the Soviet and Russian armies began, Andrey Sheptytsky first saw it as a chance to be saved from the Bolshevik godlessness, but he soon understood, how criminal and misanthropic the Hitler regime was, and strongly condemned it, like no other European bishop. At the end of August 1942, in his letter to Pope Pius the XII, he described Nazism as follows: “This system, based on lies, injustice, robbery, distortion of all the ideas of civilization and order, this system of selfishness, absurdly exaggerated total national-chauvinism and hatred of anything good or beautiful, is so phenomenal, that the first reaction caused by this monster is speechless astonishment... This may be neither more, nor less than degeneration of humanity for the first time in history of mankind”⁵².

The metropolitan was just as brave when he addressed the Reichsfuhrer Himmler regarding Holocaust of the Jews in Galicia (December 1941 – February 1942). Moreover, many Jews were hiding in Greek Catholic monasteries and even the cellars of the Metropolitan palace on St George hill in Lviv. He also ordered to hide over 300 Jewish children and important Jewish documents from the Nazis. In saving the children he had the support of brother Klyment – Father Superior of Univ Holy Dormition Lavra, where, among others, the future Minister of Foreign Relations Adam D Rotfeld found his shelter. At the same time due to the circumstances, Metropolitan had to keep this information in strict confidence from most of the clergy⁵³.

Therefore allegations of some Polish authors who accuse Metropolitan Sheptytsky of fomenting enmity between Ukrainians and Polish or even make him responsible for Volyn slaughter of civilians in 1943–1944, seem unfair. Among others, in his memoirs about Lviv, Jerzy Janicki thoughtlessly repeats the stereotypical statements of Pawei Zaremba and Edward Prus, mentioning that the great humanitarian and opponent of violence Andrey Sheptytsky “...was not only a bishop of believers, but the entire Ukrainian national movement, an ideologist and spiritual adviser of OUN and UPA (sic!), blessed the axes and wooden (!) saws that were used in fratricidal massacre in entire Podilia and Volyn”⁵⁴.

⁵¹ See: *Tserkva i suspilne pytannia. Dokumenty i materialy. 1899–1944. Kn. 1 / Red. A. Kravchuk*, Lviv, 2000, p. 262–263

⁵² See: *Mytropolyt Andrey Sheptytsky (29 lypnia 1865 – 1 lystopada 1944)*. – [Cit. 2015, October 30]. – Available at: <http://fastiv-region.gov.ua/content/ukra%D1%97na-v%D1%96dznacha%D1%94-150-r%D1%96chchya-v%D1%96d-dnya-narodzhennya-mitropolita-galitskogo-andreya-sheptit>

⁵³ *Ibidem*

⁵⁴ See: Janicki J. *Ni ma jak Lwów. Krótki przewodnik po Lwowie*, Kraków, 1990, s. 206. The research of contemporary Ukrainian historians refutes a prevailing theory of the Soviet historiography

Let it be emphasized that similar argumentation was being used by the Soviet special state security forces who persecuted the entire Greek Catholic church and Metropolitan Andrey in particular. Taking into account the high moral authority of Sheptytsky, his advanced age and health issues, they didn't dare to arrest him. Finally, in a few months, after the Red Army occupied Lviv once again, the Metropolitan passed away on the 1st of November 1944. After that the System aimed its repressions at his baby – the Greek Catholic Church, that was finally suppressed at Lviv Church Council on the 8th–10th of March 1946 after it “voluntarily” joined the RPC⁵⁵.

The Underground Church

As expected, the vast majority of the clergy and congregation of the Greek Catholic Church did not agree to the resolutions of Lviv Church Council. Its main opponents were the entourage of Andrey Sheptytsky and his successor Yosyf Slipyy. Allegations of Soviet historians, who claimed that the Greek Catholic Church went over to the Orthodoxy, without any attempts of the 2500 Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churches to stand on the Union, were not true⁵⁶. The ones, who refused to obey the most, were arrested and exiled to Siberia by the repressive system. This happened to metropolitan Yosyf Slipyy, archimandrite Klymentiy Sheptytsky and dozens of others⁵⁷.

that the leadership of UGCC supported terrorist activities of OUN-UPA both against the Soviet activists and Polish people. Moreover, metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and Bishop of Stanislaviv Hryhoriy Khomyshyn condemned such violence on many occasions, as those, who suffered in such ‘redemption actions’ were mostly innocent people (see: Lysenko O. Y. *Tserkovne zhyttia v Ukraini. 1943–1946 rr.*, Kyiv, 1998, p. 18). Furthermore, in archival documents, from the times of World War II, we find evidence of Sheptytsky's benevolent attitude to Poland and its people. One of the analytical documents of the Polish underground movement reads: “Since the time of German occupation (Metropolitan Sheptytsky) has been a good influence on anti-Polish moods in (Ukrainian) society... (Metropolitan and his entourage) are worried about the spiritual future of (their) people; even now they already see the future of Ukrainian nation in cooperation with Poland” (see: Biblioteka Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Gabinet rękopisów, sygn. 2134. *Przekrój sprawy ukraińskiej w styczniu 1943 r.*, p. 26).

⁵⁵ See: *Poslannia Papy Frantsyska do Blazhennyshoho Sviatoslava Shevchuka, Verkhovnoho Arkhyepyskopa Kyievo-Halytskoho*, <http://uk.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/03/06>; Myshchak I. *Likvidatsiya Hreko-Katolytskoyi Tserkvy v Ukraini v povoyenni roky: istoriohrafiya*. – [Cit. 2015, October 31]. – Available from: <http://christusimperat.org/uk/node/17654>. After the Lviv Church Council, the Greek Catholic communities did not want to be registered as Orthodox any more. By July 1946, 216 out of 322 priests were officially registered in Stanislaviv Region, 19 out of 270 – in Ternopil Region, and in Lviv Region 101 priests out of 281 refused to be registered. 56 of those priests quit or were repressed. By the end of 1947 1124 parochs in Galicia ‘reregistered’ to Orthodoxy (see: Lysenko O. Y. *Tserkovne zhyttia...*, p. 327–328)

⁵⁶ See: Botsiurkiv B. *Ukrajinska hreko-katolytska tserkva v katakombach (1946–1989)*, http://www.ichistory.org/ukrsite/download/Kovchek_1_6.pdf. According to the report of OUN, by the 1st of September 1946 in Lviv and Ternopil eparchy only 60 Greek Catholic priests out of those who refused to join the Orthodox Church, remained free (*ibidem*).

⁵⁷ See: Official website of the Basilian Monastery on Yasna Hora in Hoshiv – [Cit. 2015, November 28]. – Available from: <http://osbm-hoshiv.in.ua/index.php/istoriia/istoriia-monastyria>; Myshchak I. *Likvidatsiya Hreko-Katolytskoyi Tserkvy.*, Available from: <http://christusimperat.org/uk/node/17654>.

Moreover, despite the persecution, only a few Greek Catholic monks joined the Orthodox Church. Thanks to this, acting monasteries remained the centres of Ukrainian Catholicism in Galicia. Hoshiv Monastery of Basilian Monks in Yasna Hora (Dolyna Region near Ivano-Frankivsk) lasted the longest. It was closed down on the 27th of March 1950 and all the priests and monks were arrested. The authorities confiscated all the icons, golden and gilded church utensils, such as chalices, crosses, vestry books, icons etc. Other monasteries were closed down and robbed in a similar way, so the priests who were not repressed, continued their activities underground⁵⁸.

The phenomenon of the underground Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine was not a coincidence. The fact that it survived decades of persecution was caused by several factors. The first one was that the parishioners were strongly bound with the church that was created in times of metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, when the Greek Catholic Church literally became the foundation of national identity of the people of Galicia. Therefore they identified themselves as Greek Catholic and usually boycotted “foreign” Orthodox priests⁵⁹.

Furthermore, Ukrainians from Galicia, associated the Greek Catholic Church with the national liberation movement of 20-40ies, actively supported by their relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Another circumstance in favour of the UGCC was that the Russian Orthodox priests usually had a very low level of theological education, often barely knew Ukrainian and even more so Galician dialect. So the people of Galicia rightly feared that the Russian Orthodox Church would facilitate Russification of the land. Another thing that wasn't in its favour, was collaboration of many hierarchs on highest positions of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as lower clergy, with the state security services of USSR.

Organizational structure of the underground UGCC was shaped already after Stalin's death. For conspiracy reasons it was secret. Luckily, there was continuous episcopacy, which was very important under constant persecution. In 1956 two bishops returned from exile. Mykolay Charnetsky came back to Lviv and Ivan Lyatyshevsky went to Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk)⁶⁰. Apart from them seven other underground priests – Vasyl Velychkovsky, Volodymyr Streniuk, Fylymon Kuchaba, Ivan Sleziuk,

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁹ To the opinion of Ivan-Pavlo Khymka, religious and confessional traditions of Ukrainians in Galicia i.e. Greek Catholic or in other words Uniate Church, different from those of the neighboring nations, had a great influence on the creation of Ukrainian national community at the end of the 19th century. He was right – thanks to this, Galician Ukrainians were less influenced by the Polish or Russian national ideas which were to a great extent related to Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian national idea mutually strengthened each other in their confrontation with the other national and confessional identities (see: Chymka I.-P. *Hreko-Katolytska Tserkva i ukrainske natsionalne vidrodzhennia u Halychyni 1772–1918*, Kovchek, Lviv, 1993, p. 73–108).

⁶⁰ Botsiurkiv B. *Ukrainska hreko-katolytska tserkva...*, http://www.ichistory.org/ukrsite/download/Kovchek_1_6.pdf; *Katakombna tserkva. 1956–1989. Pidpilni yepyskopy, dukhovenstvo*, <http://www.ichistory.org/ukrsite/churchex/church12.html>.

Sofron Dmyterko, Ivan Semediy, and Pavlo Vasylyk were ordained. During Khrushchev's Thaw a few hundreds of Greek Catholic priests were set free. Underground seminaries worked with the blessing of bishops. The ones who taught were mostly older priests who had all the necessary theological knowledge. Let us emphasize that the priest who were ordained underground, compensated their somewhat lack of knowledge with their self-sacrifice and dedication to pastoral service⁶¹.

Altogether, by the end of the 80-ies of the 20th century in the West of Ukraine (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpatsky Regions) 241 Greek Catholic priests, 148 monks and 324 nuns performed their pastoral duties in the underground⁶². Often they worked in several regions to preserve the essence of the church and meet the needs of laities and provide the necessary religious guidance. Another phenomenon that helped preserve the Greek Catholic tradition, was the so-called crypto-uniatism. The priests and parishioners that officially converted to Orthodoxy, kept Greek Catholic traditions⁶³. It helped avoid assimilation with the state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church and ensured a considerably higher level of religiosity in the Galician Regions of URSR compared to the other regions of USSR. Thus, by the beginning of 1970-ies over 1500 (sic!) churches out of 3000 functioning ones in Ukraine, were located in the West of the country⁶⁴. These were mostly former Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churches.

Thus, it is true to say that despite the prohibition and persecution, *de facto* Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church never stopped its existence. Thus its legitimate comeback was just a matter of time and favourable political situation.

Renaissance and Current Situation

Crisis of the Soviet system at the turn of 80ies and 90ies of the 20th century and the liberalization of its ideology greatly facilitated the renaissance of the religious life in Ukraine. Significant increase in the number of religious organizations was a graphic evidence to it. While in 1985 there were 6262 religious organizations in total in Ukraine, in 1990 the amount increased by more than one third – up to 8753. The number of places of worship in use of the local religious communities doubled to 6849⁶⁵. It is

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

⁶² Bublyk T. *Rol arkhiepyskopa Volodymyra Sterniuka v lehalizatsii UGCC u 1988–1991 rokakh*, Istorija religij v Ukraini. Naukovyy shchorichnyk, 2011, kn. 1, Lviv, 2011, s. 698–699. There is other data: 259 priests and 385 monks and nuns (Boyko R. *Osoblyvosti hreko-katolytskoho pidpilla v Ukraini naperedodni lehalizatsiyi*, Naukovi zapysky Natsionalnoho universytetu “Ostrozka akademiya”. Seriya: Istorychne relihiyevnavstvo: zb. nauk. pr. Vypusk 1, Ostroh, 2009, s. 15).

⁶³ Boyko R. *Problemy kryptouniatyzmu v Halychyni v 1946 – na pochatku 1980-kh rr.*, http://vuzlib.com.ua/articles/book/18918-Problemi_kriptoun%D1%96atizmu_v_ga/1.html.

⁶⁴ See: Bilinsky Y. *Stan Ukrainskoyi pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy v URSR*, Naukovyy konhres u 1000-littia khreshchennia Rusy-Ukrainy u spivpraci z Ukrayinskym vilnym universytetom. Zbirnyk prats Yuvileynoho konhresu. Redaktor V. Yaniv, München, 1988-1989, p. 336.

⁶⁵ *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesijni vidnosyny v Ukraini* ..., p. 4–5.

worth mentioning that the highest growth rate was in the West. All in all, over 50% of all Ukrainian religious communities were located in this area. The reborn Greek Catholic Church was leading with its 2787 parishes in Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk regions⁶⁶.

The process of rebirth of the UGCC had a distinct political background. Already in 1989 during the elections of the members of the Soviet parliament in Galicia, opposition candidates included the matter of its legalization was surely included into their programs. Thus, just like in times of metropolitan Sheptytsky, the Greek Catholic Church became closely tied with the national movement. Demonstrative masses and public manifestation of the Greek Catholics in 1989 contributed to the growing anticommunist mood among the citizens of Western Ukraine⁶⁷. This was one of the main reasons why democratic forces gained a convincing victory at the elections to Verkhovna Rada of USSR in March 1990. *Democratic Block* that was in opposition to the communist party, succeeded in five regions: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Volyn, and Kyiv Regions. It tells the tale, that all the 24 mandates were won by the representatives of the People's Movement of Ukraine (Narodny Rukh Ukrainy)⁶⁸. It was to a great extent facilitated by the fact that NRU candidates mentioned revival of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and restitution of its property, stolen by the Russian Orthodox Church, which assured them support among the Greek Catholic clergy and believers.

At the same time the spiritual renaissance in Galicia uncovered a number of problems caused by the soviet policy towards religions as well as provocations of the ex-undercover men. There were also lots of unreasonable actions of earnest supporters of either one of the confessions, local authorities, and even church ministers. When Ukraine proclaimed independence, it opened ground to an active process of separation of Ukrainian churches from Russian Orthodox institutions as well as redistribution of the spheres of influence between the churches. Significant growth of the number of religious communities caused lack of religious buildings and caused first outbursts of violence⁶⁹, while 1677 Greek Catholic communities and about 1100 new parishes of the Autocephalous Church were registered in 1990. Altogether, there were two major lines of interconfessional confrontation. The first one was between the Catholic and Orthodox churches i.e. all branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy on one side, and Greek-

⁶⁶ Yarmolenko M. *Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv v Ukraini u radiansku i postradiansku dobu*, Lviv, 2012, p. 86.

⁶⁷ For more see: *Ibidem*, p. 83–84 *Bahatotysiachna manifestaciya ukraïnskych hreko-katolykiv 17 veresnya 1989 r. nazavzhdy zminyla doliu Tserkvy v Ukraini*, <http://ichistory.org.ua/blog/2014/09/17/bahatotysiachna-manifestatsiya-ukrayins-kyh-greko-katolykiv-17-veresnya-1989-r-nazavzhdy-zminyla-dolyu-tserkvy-v-ukrayini/>. According to different estimations, only a manifestation for the legalization of UGCC on the 17th of September 1989 in Lviv gathered from 50 000 to 250 000 people.

⁶⁸ Rysich Y. *Vybory: vid formalizmu do demokratyzmu (dosvid Ukrainy v 70–90-i roky XX st.)*, Visnyk TDTU 1996, no 1, p. 107.

⁶⁹ Bielikova N.Y. *Mizhkonfesiyni konflikty v Ukraini ta poshuk shliakhiv yich podolannia (90–i roky XX stolittia)*, http://www.iai.dn.ua/_u/iai/dtp/CONF/7/articles/sec2/s2a1.html.

and to lesser extent Roman Catholics on the other. The second one was confrontation between different branches of the Orthodox Church i.e. UOC-MP on one side, and UOC-KP and UAOC on the other side⁷⁰.

Supported by various political forces, that used religious contradictions to their own interest, the conflict grew from an internal to a national issue⁷¹. Thus, in 1995, interconfessional tensions were present in nearly 600 locations in Ukraine. Two years later, there were 446 cities and villages, where the religious environment could be considered edgy, moreover in 158 of them, there was an open confrontation between church communities. In 85% of these settlements, there was a conflict between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic communities⁷². Unfortunately, Western part of Ukraine was a leader in this too, including Lviv Region. Fifty five conflict situations were recorded there in 1995, and they involved over 2000 law enforcement officers to restrain the warring parties. Moreover, confrontation was also recorded in 34 settlements in the vicinity of Sambir in 1995⁷³.

The national authorities took a number of measures to improve the situation, and at least reduce, if not eliminate interconfessional tension. At the end of 1996, with support of the President of Ukraine, senior priests of all traditional Christian churches, as well as Jewish and Muslim organizations created an All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO). The Council was created as a representative interconfessional advisory body that was aimed to combine the efforts of religious organizations, NGOs, and public agencies for the sake of implementing social and cultural projects and finding solutions of issues that arose in the relations between the state and the churches etc.⁷⁴

Somewhat later, on the 21st of July 1997 at the initiative of heads and representatives of various confessions, a document, important for the regulation of the conflicts between churches, was signed in the presence of President Leonid Kuchma. It was called a *Memorandum of the Christian Confessions of Ukraine on Non-Acceptance of any Violence in Interconfessional Relations*. The memorandum was signed by the representatives of the UOC-MP, UOC-KP, UGCC, UAOC, the Roman Catholic

⁷⁰ Novychenko M. *Mizhkonfesiyni konflikty*, Liudyna i svit, 1995, n 9, p. 17–18.

⁷¹ According to the sociological studies, religious conflicts caused uneasiness for 59.3% of the citizens of Ukraine. 54.8% of the respondents were worried by the fact that interconfessional confrontation complicated work of the authorities, 59.4% thought it affected international relations, 64.2% – spiritual renaissance, and for 52.1. it affected relations in the family (Bielikova N.Y. *Mizhkonfesiyni konflikty v Ukraini ...*).

⁷² Ibidem.

⁷³ Yarmolenko M. *Rehionalni osoblyvosti etnokulturnykh protsesiv...*, p. 90–91.

⁷⁴ At the beginning of 2012, AUCCRO consisted out of 18 churches and religious organizations, as well as one interchurch religious organization, that together represented 95% of the religious network and all Ukrainian confessions: Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, and Protestant (Evangelist) branches of Christianity, as well as main branches of Judaism and Islam (*Vseukrainska Rada Tserkov i relihiynykh orhanizatsiy/ Ofitsiyne internet predstavnytstvo*, <http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/council>; <http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/council/members>).

Church (RCC), and several Ukrainian protestant churches. Among others, it was emphasized in the Memorandum, that the representatives of Christian confessions realize the complexity of the religious environment in Ukraine. Under these circumstances they are strongly determined not to tolerate any attempts to solve the interconfessional issues by using violence, especially when it comes to the property of churches. Moreover, they committed to solve any disputes exclusively by negotiations, based on mutual respect and tolerance and stated their willingness to avoid requesting for the authorities to pressure any religious community or church. It was stressed that any attempts to capture the churches, attack clergy or parishioners of other confessions are not to be put up with⁷⁵.

Thanks to the actions taken at the turn of the 20th and the 21st centuries the situation in the religious sphere mostly stabilized. In 1998 the number of communities, where the confrontation between representatives of different confessions was still present, decreased to 350⁷⁶. The need for religious buildings was met by handing over the existing churches that had been used for other purposes in the Soviet times (as warehouses, cinemas, museums etc.)⁷⁷, as well as by building the new ones at the expense of the parishioners or benefactors. Thus, from 1990 to 2000 the number of buildings that belonged to various religious confessions, more than doubled – from 6 849 to 16 637. Moreover, they were allowed to use 3 938 architectural monuments⁷⁸.

Altogether, the 90-ies of the 20th century may be described as a period of religious renaissance and the time when a new quality of spiritual life of Ukrainians was formed. Unfortunately, after all the totalitarian restrictions and prohibitions were removed, there were huge interconfessional tensions and conflicts. The process of extensive development of both Christian and non-Christian churches was mainly finished by 2000. It was then, that one could notice a clear tendency to stabilization and more equal distribution of the network of religious institutions. Thus, while in 1990 the number of religious organizations annually grew by 5–8%, it only grew by 4–5% in 2000–2005, and only by around 2% in 2007–2009⁷⁹. Moreover, the Western region lost its absolute leadership in the number of legal religious communities⁸⁰.

⁷⁵ *Memorandum khrystyianskych konfesiiv Ukrainy pro nespryiniattia sylovykh diy u mizhkonfesiinykh vzayemovidnosynakh*, Liudyna i svit, 1997, n 8, p. 25–26.

⁷⁶ Bielikova N.Y. *Mizhkonfesiyni konflikty v Ukraini...*

⁷⁷ *Pro zakhody shchodo povernennia relihiynym orhanizatsiyam kultovoho mayna: Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 04.03.1992, n. 125*, Zakonodavcha baza VRU: www.rada.gov.ua *Pro povernennia relihiynym orhanizatsiyam kultovoho mayna: Rozporiadzhennia Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 22.06.1994, n 53/94-rp*, Zakonodavcha baza VRU. Available from: www.rada.gov.ua

⁷⁸ *Terkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ In 2015 the number of religious communities in Ukraine grew only by 1.1% (see: *Zvit pro merezhu tserkov i relihiynykh orhanizatsiy v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 2015 r.* Forma nr 1. *Zvit pro merezhu relihiynykh orhanizatsiy v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 2016 r.* Forma nr 1. Author's calculation).

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 3, 34.

At the same time, when it comes to absolute values of density of religious communities, Western Ukraine is still a leader with its Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi Regions. While in general, the density of religious communities in Ukraine is around 0,7 per locality, in Western regions this number is twice or even three times as big⁸¹. Altogether, on the 1st of January 2015 there were 12 164 religious communities here, which made for 36% of all religious communities in entire Ukraine (33 781 communities)⁸². The number of believers is the highest too – almost 10% in 2003–2011⁸³.

It is also worth mentioning that the region is heterogeneous, when it comes to confessions, which is a consequence of its history – the land was a part of different countries and empires between the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. Thus, Orthodox churches dominate in Volyn and Rivne regions, the Protestant and Orthodox ones – in Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions, while the Greek Catholic Church undoubtedly dominates in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil regions⁸⁴. Again, that confirms the fact that none of the Christian confessions is significantly superior, however certain denominations prevail in certain regions.

Former monopoly of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia (before 1946) was not restored even in Lviv Region. The diversity of confessions in the region nowadays represents the tendencies in entire Ukraine. Apart from the Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches, three Orthodox and several protestant denominations, there are Armenian, Jewish, and after the annexation of Crimea by Russia – even Muslim communities. There are also supporters of RUNVira (Ridna Ukrainska Narodna Vira – Native Ukrainian National Faith), Krishnaism, Buddhism, and paganism. According to statistics, UGCC is an obvious leader, represented by 1534 communities in Lviv Region; the Orthodox churches have 947 communities in total (including 480 of UOC-KP, 386 of UAOC, and 72 of UOC-MP), the Roman Catholic Church has 137 communities, and the supporters of different branches of Protestantism have 403 communities altogether.

Thus, including a small number of communities that are parts of the new charismatic religious movements, that are rather “exotic” for this region, Greek Catholic parishes in Lviv Region are only 51%, comparing to 53% in 2011 and 55,5% in 2000⁸⁵. Though

⁸¹ *Suchasna relihiyna sytuatsiya v Ukraini*, http://pidruchniki.com/16011013/religiyeznavstvo/suchasna_relihiyna_situatsiya_ukrayini.

⁸² *Zvit pro merezhu tserkov i relihiynykh orhanizatsiy v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 2015 r. Forma nr 1*. Author's calculation.

⁸³ See: *Suchasna relihiyna sytuatsiya...*; *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 39. Author's calculation.

⁸⁴ For more details see: Oleksyn Y.V. *Derzhavno-tserkovni vidnosyny v zakhidnomu rehioni Ukrainy 90-ky rokiv XX – pochatku XXI st. Avtoreferat dysertatsiyi na zdobuttia naukovooho stupenia kandydata istorichnykh nauk*, Ivano-Frankivsk, 2011, p. 12.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*. Author's calculation. *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 34.

according to the recent sociological research, over 60% of faithful people in the region, consider themselves parishioners of the Greek Catholic Church⁸⁶.

Religiousness of the locals is another important component and indicator of the religious environment in the studied region. Lviv Area has the highest religiosity rate, which is predetermined by the dominance of Greek Catholic Church as well as presence of numerous Roman Catholic and Protestant parishes. In this region the number of those, who do not consider themselves a part of any religious group, is the lowest in Ukraine – only 4%, which is much lower, than even in Poland, the most religious country in Eastern Europe (here 10% of inhabitants consider themselves ‘not religious’ and 5% are ‘convinced atheists’)⁸⁷.

At the same time, Western Ukraine is the region where religion is considered to be highly important for the society and local public life. The rate is the highest in Ukraine and equals 4,31 out of 5 compared to 3,87, which is the average for Ukraine (in 2010). It is also worth mentioning that the index has grown considerably in Ukraine in general – from 3,37 in 2000 to 3,49 in 2005⁸⁸. Nevertheless, despite the high level of declared religiousness, religion does not one of the main issues in the scale of values of an average Ukrainian (16th place in Ukraine, 13th place in Western Ukraine), which indicates a relatively high level of modernization and secularization of Ukrainian society in general⁸⁹.

At the same time regional statistics unambiguously show that Greek Catholic Church has the first place in most areas of spiritual and religious life of Ukrainians⁹⁰. Thus, for Greek Catholics religious education is quite important (3rd place in the scale of values comparing to the 8th position among parishioners of UOC-MP and 9th among the parishioners of UOC-KP). They are also more consistent in their religious beliefs and practices – 99% of them implicitly believe in God, 88% believe that people have a soul, 71% believe in life after death (the average for all confessions is much lower – 72%, 50%, and 36% respectively), while 55% of parishioners of UGCC find religious certainty i.e. being a part of a certain creed important, comparing to an average of 32% among all religious citizens in general⁹¹.

⁸⁶ Data from: *Suchasna relihiynist Ukrainy v yevropeyskomu konteksti: rezultaty sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen Bohdan O. V. ta Sereby V. V.* Author's personal archive.

⁸⁷ *Polshcha vyznana naybilsh relihiynoyu krayinoyu Schidnoyi Yevropy*, <http://viza.vn.ua/polska-najbardziej-religijnych-w-europie.html>

⁸⁸ *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 42

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 42–43.

⁹⁰ Only Jewish communities sometimes show higher numbers (e.g. the frequency of attending the churches equals 4.3 out of 5), but the number of such communities reaches only 300 in entire Ukraine, including 10 in Lviv Region (see: *Suchasna relihiynist Ukrainy v yevropeyskomu konteksti...*; *Zvit pro merezhu relihiynych orhanizatsiy v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia 2016 r.* Author's calculation).

⁹¹ *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 43. The level of religious identity is the highest in Galicia – over 4 points out of 5 (growing in 2015 in particular). See: *Suchasna relihiynist Ukrainy v yevropeyskomu konteksti...*

Moreover, the parishioners of Greek Catholic Church are those who follow the practice of attending divine services the most. According to statistics 85% of inhabitants of Western Ukraine and 49% of inhabitants of Eastern Ukraine attend church regularly, 91% of them being the parishioners of UGCC⁹². They are also those, who attend Sunday masses the most – 36% (4 points out of 5 in average in Galicia, over 4 points out of 5 among the parishioners of UGCC)⁹³. Greek Catholic parishioners know the biggest number of prayers 71% know 2–5 prayers, 8% know only 1, and less than 1% do not know any prayers at all (to compare, among the parishioners of UOC-MP about 63% know 1–3 prayers, while 8% do not know any; in UOC KP – 67% and 10% respectively)⁹⁴. Moreover, the Greek Catholics most often support their church financially (32% of parishioners compared to 15% in average)⁹⁵. Finally, for 82% of UGCC parishioners their church is a moral authority, compared to 75% in UOC-MP and 61% in UOC-KP⁹⁶.

Resume

At the moment Ukraine is probably the only country in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), where the structure of churches is similar to the one in the United States of America. To a great extent it is caused by certain historical similarities. Ukrainians, just like Americans, had to fight for their independence, if only much later. But as they did not have a national church, after gaining independence they had a choice – remain true to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate or choose a different confession. What is more important, as José Casanova emphasizes, Ukrainian State (just like the US Government 240 years ago) did not support any church or confession in particular, which resulted in active competition between churches, especially in Galicia⁹⁷.

Nowadays Ukraine in general and Galician Regions in particular, do not face the situation, typical for most Central and Eastern European Countries, where a monopoly concept of evaluation of social behaviour, formed by a dominating religion, has forced out or is forcing out pluralism of approaches. Also, Ukraine is unlike some of CEE countries (e.g. Poland or Russia), where despite the demonopolization of the religious market, a monopoly of narrative and interpretation of the world by the representatives of prevalent denominations remains.

⁹² 31,6% of active parishioners in Ukraine are Greek Catholic, which is 1,6 times more than the part of Greek Catholic parishioners in Ukraine – 18,6% (see: Oleksiyenko O. *Relihiyna palitra Ukrainy...*).

⁹³ At the same time, the number of parishioners, who only attend church on big holidays, is about 50%, including various regions of Galicia (see: *Suchasna relihiynist Ukrainy v yevropeyskomu konteksti...*).

⁹⁴ *Tserkovno-relihiyna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini...*, p. 45.

⁹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 47–48.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 48–49.

⁹⁷ Див.: José Casanova: *Ukraina – yedyna krayina v Yevropi...*

Current state of affairs in the religious sphere in Ukraine confirms that pluralism is one of the main features of modern democratic societies. Unlike in traditional ones, where identity of an individual is predefined, unambiguous, invariable and tightly connected with the structure of the society, in a modern society the individuals may chose their own identity from many options, and may even further change it. This is also true in religion, especially in Eastern Galicia.

What is special about this region, is first and foremost the fact that unlike in the rest of Ukraine, where Orthodoxy is a dominant religion, it is mostly Catholic and Protestant. In numbers, these two communities are twice as big as the Orthodox one⁹⁸. Moreover, despite the predisposition of the people of Galicia to conservatism, due to civilizational Western European influences in this region, *sacrum* has almost entirely been divided from *profanum*, i.e. the religious and secular matters do not come and in hand and the use of religious norms has been restricted mostly to religious practice only. Also, a part of the society now has a critical approach to religious dogmas, and they can be discussed freely; one may see pronounced processes of particularization and universalization in the local society. This has further caused a partial elimination of interconfessional barriers, but at the same time there are still supporters of exclusivity and keeping the differences. Therefore nowadays in the Eastern Galician Region the religious ideas are a basis both for conservative views as well as the modern movements.

It is also worth mentioning, that even though for Eastern Galicia, and Lviv Region in particular, secularization of social life and individuals, is quite typical, at the same time traditional churches, above all the UGCC, maintain strong positions, especially comparing to other regions. On one hand the results of religious renaissance⁹⁹ are quite impressive, while on the other hand we see the phenomenon of so-called “individual religiosity”, which means there’s increasingly more barely practicing and non-practicing Christians – the number now reaches almost 60% (sic!)¹⁰⁰.

Of course the facts and tendencies, provided above, are only a much generalized image of the religiosity of the inhabitants of Western Ukraine. In fact the situation is much more complex. One should remember that there are differences in religiosity between the inhabitants of big cities and small villages, as well as the differences

⁹⁸ Nevertheless the influence of the Eastern (Bisantian) tradition on the charakter of the Greek Catholic Church as well as the social reations in the Galician Region is still quite strong. This is another evidence of the difference between Western Ukraine and the neighbouring Eastern Poland (which is also catholic) (for more information see: Sokolov I. I. *O vizantinizme*, <http://krotov.info/history/08/sokolov/page02.html>).

⁹⁹ 89% of the inhabitants of the Western Ukraine consider themselves religious. This is much more than in Poland, was been recognized as the most religious country in CEE in 2013 (only 81%) (see: *Tserkovno-relihiynna sytuatsiya i derzhavno-konfesiyni vidnosyny v Ukraini ...*, p. 60; *Polshcha vyznana naybilsh relihiynoyu krayinoyu Schidnoyi Yevropy*, <http://viza.vn.ua/polska-najbardziej-religijnych-w-europie.html>).

¹⁰⁰ Дані походять з: *Suchasna relihiynist Ukrainy v yevropeyskomu konteksti...*

between various social groups with different levels of education, wealth, sex, age, sexual orientation etc. Discovery of those differences shall require a separate, much more detailed study.

УКРАЇНСЬКА ГРЕКО-КАТОЛИЦЬКА ЦЕРКВА В ГАЛИЧИНІ: СТВОРЕННЯ, ЗАБОРОНА, І ВІДРОДЖЕННЯ. ЗАГАЛЬНИЙ ОГЛЯД

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Автор представив короткий опис релігійної ситуації в Східній Галичині з часів створення уніатської церкви до наших днів. Особлива увага приділена часам митрополита Андрея Шептицького, діяльності Української Греко-Католицької Церкви в період підпілля і її відродженню у 1989 році. Стаття також описує історію Церкви після того, як Україна відновила свою незалежність.

Ключові слова: Україна, Східна Галичина, Львівська область, релігія, церква, конфесії, католицизм, православ'я, протестантизм, Українська Греко-Католицька Церква, митрополит Андрей Шептицький, всеукраїнська рада церков і релігійних організацій (ВРЦіРО).

Стаття надійшла до редколегії 10.11.2016

Прийнята до друку 21.11.2016