A HISTORY FROM OLYMPIAN HEIGHTS?
ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE’S VISION OF UKRAINE

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This article discusses the reflections on Ukraine and its past of Arnold J. Toynbee, one of the leading British historians of the twentieth century. Within the complex realm of international affairs and comparative history – always at the forefront of his interests – he assigned pride of place to such generally neglected subject in the British intellectual milieu as the Ukrainian problem. At first Toynbee heard about Ukraine from “an importunate and exotic freshman,” Lewis Namier, who studied with him at Balliol College, Oxford. Growing up with the problem of Eastern Galicia, Namier, even living abroad often told about his developed sympathy for the native Ruthenian population. The events of the World War I provoked the British attention on the local problems of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires and of course Toynbee did not stay aloof.

The historian from the beginning of the war decided to explain to the British public the complications that lay behind the assassination at Sarajevo. Toynbee’s first book, The Nationality and the War tells about that the peace is possible when the local people will have freedom of choice in all spheres. The author also recognizes the complexity of the Ukrainian issue. At first, the territory of Ukraine was divided into two parts, which located in two different empires. Second, none of this empires not recognized the Ukrainian population as a separate nation. Despite Russian cliché Toynbee well understood that “Little Russians” or Ukrainians had had a much more ancient and brilliant culture and history than the “Great Russians”.

The second work of historian was “The New Europe,” some essays in reconstruction. The author again maintains his opinion on the absolute difference between the Ukrainian and Russian people. Nevertheless he did not allow the idea of Ukraine’s independence and tied its future only in federative union with Russia. Toynbee, however, came to significant conclusions, which he later developed in his fundamental A Study of History. The Ukrainian territories are located “between the North and the South, the forest and the steppe”, had cultural influenced from every side. This information is important for understanding further historical processes.

Toynbee’s whole theory of comparative history stood on his concept of civilizations however he does not consider Ukraine or Great Russia to be one of the world’s twenty-one distinct civilizations or even a satellite one. These lands are referred to Byzantine Orthodox civilization. In his post-World War II writings Toynbee analyses the confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union of the Cold War and he clearly understood willingness of the Ukrainians to independence. As a consequence Toynbee helped to acquaint the western public with Ukraine, furthermore he explains important aspects of Ukraine’s development as a region at a crossroads of various cultural and political influences, but ignores some aspects that do not fit into his scheme.

Key words: Arnold J. Toynbee, nationality, Ukrainians, civilization, history interpretation, Ukrainian issue.

Introduction. Arnold J. Toynbee (1889–1975) is one of the best known, the most widely reviewed, and the most influential historians of the 20th century. He was born
in Britain but his thoughts and views were worldwide. His greatest work, *A Study of History* (12 vols.), offered an interpretation of the history of every civilization and religion that has ever existed, and combined the methods and vision of history, religion, philosophy, and literature. Toynbee’s observations on Ukraine are no less apt, if more sparse, than are his appraisals of the many world civilizations he evaluated. While, as he himself was aware, his knowledge of Ukraine did not approximate his knowledge of the older worlds whose histories he had absorbed, it was nevertheless sufficient, in part supported by firsthand information, to enable Toynbee to offer judgements of interest to both scholars and general readers. Thus the aim of this paper is not to critique in detail Toynbee’s analysis of the Ukrainian past, but to examine his general view on Ukraine’s place amongst the main world civilizations, as well as to elucidate the political and scientific reasoning under which his attitude toward Ukraine developed.

**“Ruritania or Ruthenia?” Toynbee encounters the Ukraine.** The Ukrainian theme drew Toynbee’s attention for the first time in 1909 when he began his third year as an undergraduate at Balliol College, Oxford. One autumn morning he involuntarily received a visit from “an importunate and exotic freshman”, Lewis Namier, who brought with him “trailing clouds of Eastern Europe” into Toynbee’s life. “These clouds floated into my room behind him, and they quickly filled it, as Bernstein’s (Namier’s original surname – R. S.) stream of talk flowed on”, –Toynbee mentioned in his notable *Acquaintances*.

This Balliol freshman had a good understanding of the East Galician situation, so rare amongst the educated Englishmen of the early twentieth century. He was born in Russian-ruled Poland, but some years later his family moved to Austrian Eastern Galicia, where he spent his childhood. Growing up with the problem of Eastern Galicia, Namier early on in his life developed sympathy for the native Ruthenian population. As Toynbee recalled, Namier’s recitations on his home province, Ruthenia, might last very long, and somebody might find himself his story’s prisoner. Some of the Balliol undergraduates refused to listen to Namier’s picturesque tales on Ruthenia, considering them inventions; for others, on the contrary, it was the only reason to listen him.

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2 No specific historical research has been written about Toynbee’s attitudes toward Ukraine, but one may find very brief considerations of his views on this subject in some articles dealing with a particular theme in his writing, such as Russian or East European history (Leo Okinshevich, “History of civilization of Eastern Europe in the work of Arnold Toynbee,” *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no 2 (4) (Summer 1952): 305–315; Jesse D. Clarkson, “Toynbee on Slavic and Russian history,” *Russian Review* 15, no 3 (July 1956): 165–172; Heinrich Stammler, “Russia between Byzantium and Utopia,” *Russian Review* 17, no 2 (April 1958): 94–103).


5 Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, 63.
In a young Englishman’s picture of the world, Eastern Europe as a whole, and Ukraine specifically, was still a *terra incognita* early in the twentieth century, though regions that were far more remote from England – for instance, India, China, and even Malaya – already meant something to him, thanks to memoirs of his older relatives; many of them were sailors, officers in the King’s army, and civil servants in the British colonies. In this respect Toynbee, as he acknowledged later in his *Acquaintances*, was typical of his generation and his kind in England. Most of his contemporaries at Balliol “persisted in their state of invincible ignorance about Eastern Europe”. Namier’s talks about Ruthenia reminded them of Anthony Hope’s “Ruritanian cycle”. Though now considered to be a comparatively minor figure, Hope was a popular writer at the turn of the nineteenth century due to the fame and success of his “Ruritanian” novels. Ruritania was a fictitious land in South-Eastern Europe in which his historical romances, beginning with *The Prisoner of Zenda* (1894), took place. This is why many young Englishmen could identify consciously or unconsciously Namier’s Ruthenia with Pope’s Ruritania in their imagination. In most cases this likeness of the two geographical names, imagined and real one, was used with the purpose to make fun of Namier and his world, East Europe, Ruthenia and so on. They therefore did not take him seriously, were “allergic to him and his homeland”, and they could not recognize that his world was, in contrast to Pope’s world, real. Toynbee took a different position:

“My own reaction to Bernstein’s uninvited visit to me was positive, I am glad to say. […] I did not find his clouds of Eastern Europe suffocating; I found them entrancing. His monologue did not bore me; it held me spell-bound. As he talked on, piece after piece of the East European nebula came into focus and then coagulated into a world that was as solid as my Winchester and Oxford world, yet, at the same time, was fascinatingly unfamiliar and complex. This was a feast for my curiosity. When my visitor left, I was eager to see and hear him again; and, during the next two years, this first session of ours was frequently repeated – on my initiative as often as not”.

Toynbee and Namier drew closer to one another on the grounds of common interest in learning of new lands and peoples. In spite of his undergraduate status, Toynbee preferred to listen to the Balliol freshman, more familiar with European situation, than to speak himself: “Bernstein wanted to talk; I wanted to listen. Bernstein had more to tell me than I had to tell him. Bernstein was opportunely filling a blank in my picture of the world”. Thus, before the outbreak of the World War I Toynbee had already a good knowledge of the Ukrainian problem, and was partially aware of the international tensions, which it caused. Nothing of the kind can be said about most of British society. When after a visit to his home province, Eastern Galicia, at Christmas 1912 or at Easter 1913, Namier remarked about the threat of a European war breaking out in the region, his warning was received with taunts at Oxford. Ruritania was remembered once again.

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6 Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, 64.

7 Ibid., 63–64.
“At the words “European war”, most of the young Englishmen whom Bernstein was addressing in Balliol front quad burst out laughing, as the Athenians had laughed when St. Paul, in his address to them on the Areopagus, came to the words “resurrection from the dead”:

Too good to be true! Ruritania was running true to form! As entertaining as a novel of Anthony Hope’s! […] Ruritania? But what about Utopia? Certainly, Bernstein’s world and the laughers’ world could not both be real; for they were mutually incompatible. Which of the two would prove to have been the reality and which would prove to have been the mirage? It was Bernstein’s world, not the laughers’ world, whose reality was vindicated in the event. Within three years of this fantastic conversation in the quad, half of those unfortunate laughers were dead”.

Indeed, it was World War I that had a crucial influence on the British attitudes toward Eastern Europe. The British government could not be indifferent to territorial changes, such as the dismemberment of two great European powers – Austria-Hungary and Russia, since these changes would affect the balance of power in Europe as a whole. The problem of self-definition, which arose in Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the war, had come to concern Britons, and so far as it concerned them it depended upon them for its solution – upon their intellectual judgments, the making up of their mind, and upon their familiarity with the region.

“The Ukraine – a problem in nationality”: Toynbee’s first attempt at a definition. Before the outbreak of hostilities the British government knew little about the subject of nationalities of Eastern Europe and even less about the complexity of their politics; it was not and had no reason to be of interest to them. The government was, however, interested in promoting any national movement that might assist it in the conduct of the war. Between 1914 and 1916 this general policy involved the use and encouragement of subjected nationalities by way of intensifying of the war propaganda efforts. With this end in the mind the government created at Wellington House a propaganda agency in August 1914. The staff of Wellington House consisted of authors, journalists and academics that had some knowledge of Central and Eastern Europe and the ability to produce propaganda. Most of the propaganda was in the form of pamphlets dealing with the nationalities under the Habsburg rule, but some submerged nationalities of the Russian Empire were unintentionally touched upon too.

Regardless of these developments, Toynbee from the beginning of the war decided to take up the question of nationality as manifest in recent European and Near Eastern affairs, hoping to explain to the British public the complications that lay behind the assassination at Sarajevo, and to prepare the way for a just and durable peace by informing public opinion about all disputed problems that would have to arise at the

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8 Toynbee, Acquaintances, 64.
9 Ibid., 65.
peace conference\textsuperscript{11}. As a result of his strenuous work Toynbee’s first book, \textit{Nationality and the War}, appeared in the spring of 1915. Within Europe and the Near East, Toynbee was convinced that the principle of nationality required a radical redrawing of political boundaries. Peace could be assured only if local peoples were allowed to set up governments of their own choosing.

But this general rule had its exceptions and the Ukrainian question belonged to these, not only because Ukraine formed a part of Britain’s ally, the Russian empire, in the World War I but also owing to Toynbee’s personal vision of its history, culture, and political significance. The “Russian race”, according to him, fell into “two great divisions, distinguished by considerable difference of dialect”. The “Great Russian” group, which was composed of three sub-sections (Northern, Western, and Eastern), occupied the whole North of the country. The extension of the “Great Russians” coincided on the whole with the forest-zone of the country. The “Little Russians”, which shaped the second group, lay South of them, deployed in a long line on the “borderland between forest and steppe, which extends from the headwaters of the Vistula and Dniester systems in the Carpathians towards the E.N.E., till it strikes the upper course of the Don near Voronezh”\textsuperscript{12}. Toynbee was aware that Little Russians or Ukrainians had had a much more ancient and brilliant culture and history than the Great Russians. Describing Little Russians, Toynbee wrote:

“This wide-flung ribbon of population has a strong national feeling of its own. The “Great Russian” can claim that it was he who freed the race from the Moslem [Tatar] yoke, and that the living Russia of the present, with its glories of arms and of letters, is solely his creation; but the “Little Russian” looks back to the day before the Mongol appeared in the land, when the Dniepr (Dnipro – R. S.), not the Volga, was the holy river of Russia, and Kiev (Kyiv – R. S.), half way down its course, her holy city, the meeting-place of the “strong government” and the world-religion that came up to her from opposite quarters, out of the Baltic and the Black Sea. He regards himself as the true heir to this primitive tradition, and his loyalty to it is all the keener because so many centuries lie between the Golden Age and his present obscurity”\textsuperscript{13}.

Based on this quotation one may affirm that Toynbee supposed “Rus’” when he wrote “Russia”, since it is difficult to think that the “Russian race” included “Little Russians”. Rather vice versa the old “Rus’” state, shaped on the Dnieper banks with the capital in Kyiv, gave origins to the Great Russian nation, contemporarily known as Russians (Rossiiane). Toynbee entirely realized the historical circumstances that contributed to such a substitution of national names. While “the Slavs of the northern forest had escaped the hurricanes that devastated the Ukraine” and had formed the Great Moscow principality, “Little Russia, unlike Muscovy, never recovered from the Mongol catastrophe”. She escaped from allegiance to the Tatar only by submission to

\textsuperscript{11} McNeil, \textit{Arnold J. Toynbee}, 69.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 310.
the Lithuanian and then Polish-Lithuanian State. The Muscovite tsardom, on the contrary, had expanded until Peter the Great reorganized it into a powerful empire early in the 18th century. This empire, which took the name Russian Empire, gained in Europe “glories of arms and of letters” under this name. Meanwhile even when the Polish-Lithuanian State was broken up, Ukraine did not win her unity from the resettlement, but was divided with the rest of the spoils between St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Toynbee’s extraordinary capacity for rapid composition and for gathering and digesting vast amounts of disparate information about contemporary politics were demonstrated in *Nationality and the War* for the first time. This capacity sustained his subsequent career as author of annual surveys of international affairs during the inter-war period. Not surprisingly, his work was noticed by the Foreign Office and leading persons in Britain’s war-time propaganda machine. As a result of the book’s analytical and information brilliance, its author was invited to join the government propaganda outfit, Wellington House. Toynbee started his new work on May 1, 1915 and found it interesting. The result was a series of pamphlets, which later were compiled to form his new book, “The New Europe”, *some essays in reconstruction*. In a pamphlet of this series Toynbee attempted to ascertain the problem of national titles, progressing in his awareness of Ukrainian situation:

“To be told that Ukrainians are the same as Ruthenians hardly enlightens our ignorance. Only the equation with “Little Russians” appears to explain their obscurity. Then they are not really a nation after all, but a variety of Russian, speaking, doubtless, a dialect of the Russian language? […] But this facile explanation is precisely the inference we are meant to draw from the name “Little Russian.” That is why it has been invented by the “Muscovites” – we must be careful of our terms, for the true Ukrainian would never call the man of Moscow or Petrograd a “Russian,” nor even a “Great Russian,” he claims the Russian name for himself. But titles may pass”.

In reality this was no academic debate. It was waged on the field of practical politics, and Toynbee understood it well. Toynbee did not doubt the individuality of the Ukrainian people, because “the two peoples were not one nation already before their union under the Romanoff Dynasty”. But political reasons resulting from war time dictated the preservation of the multi-national Russian empire, and thus the Ukrainians’ hope for the redemption of their nationality through the dismemberment of the Russian empire and their contemplation of an independent Ukrainian state were declared a German intrigue. That is why Toynbee did not allow the idea of Ukraine’s independence and considered its future only in federative union with Russia (just like almost all Ukrainian intellectuals of this time!):

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"Kieff and Odessa divorced from Russia! Russia excluded from the Black Sea! Of course the scheme is impracticable. Such an assertion of their national individuality would bring anything but advantage to the Ukrainians themselves. […] To part them is impossible, and would remain so even if the Allies were beaten to the earth. This is no solution. […] A settlement can only be reached through a compromise under which each party shall secure its real needs at the price of waiving its extreme claims. Russia must have her geographical unity, the Ukraine her national rights"17.

Examining Ukrainian history during the World War I for the aims of propaganda, Toynbee, however, came to two significant conclusions, which he later developed in his fundamental A Study of History. First, he pointed out that “the «Ukraine» means simply the «border-land» – between North and South, forest and steppe” – and in this respect it is opened to cultural influences from every side. This is not so much an independent region as a border intermediate between others. Secondly, it was “the people of Kieff”, who developed “their Scandinavian government and Byzantine religion into a Slavonic civilization with a new individuality of its own”18.

A “channel of Western cultural radiation”: Ukraine’s place in the network of World civilizations. Toynbee’s achievement and reputation depend primarily upon his most stunning work, to which he gave the unpretentious name A Study of History. Counting from 1921 when, according to his testimony, he began planning the book, until the moment he published the one-volume revision, Toynbee labored on what he regarded as one book for fifty years. He had contemplated the problem of comparative history underlying the book even longer – since August 1914 and the outbreak of the World War I. A Study of History is the most comprehensive attempt to understand the recurrent processes of universal history ever produced19.

Toynbee’s whole theory of comparative history stood on his concept of civilizations, which interact in historical time. Early in volume one he designated two criteria for identifying civilizations and distinguishing them from each other. The first was the religion of the civilization (for instance, Orthodoxy, Islam), and the second was geographical extent. When the first three volumes appeared in 1934, Toynbee counted twenty-one independent civilizations in the World, but then drastically reduced the number of them to thirteen by simplification and by the invention of a subclass, called “satellite civilizations”, that included fifteen members and allowed him to rearrange…

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17 Toynbee, British view of the Ukrainian question, 10–11.
18 Ibid., 5–6.
some and add new ones to his list. Thus he raised his total number to twenty-eight, plus six abortive civilizations.\footnote{C. T. McIntire and Marvin Perry, “Toynbee’s Achievement,” 18–23.}

Toynbee does not consider Ukraine or Great Russia to be one of the world’s twenty-one distinct civilizations or even a satellite one. Rather he includes them into the Orthodox or Russian civilization, which was an offshoot herself of Byzantine Orthodox civilization. Russia, Toynbee states, “had always been a satellite, yet always one of an unusual kind”. Not only did Russia more than hold its own “against the foreign body that had drawn her into its field of attraction”, but reversing the usual order, the satellite had threatened to usurp the sun’s place and reduced the original sun to the status of a satellite.\footnote{Arnold Toynbee, \textit{A Study of History}, 12 vols. (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1934–1961), vol. 12, 539.} Nevertheless, the original underlay of Russian civilization remained Byzantine. It seems that we have here a lot of misinterpretation in Toynbee’s uncritical identification of the “Russian civilization” with the nineteenth of twentieth Russian state. His writings of the war times indicate that Toynbee meant \textit{Rus’ka}, but not \textit{Russkaia}, when he wrote Russian. The origins of the Russian universal church as the first distinguished criteria of a civilization were in the Kyivan period (Rus’ converted to Christianity in 988). In this respect we can speak about the Eastern European civilization as the Ukrainian one no less than as the Russian till the fifteenth century. It was the Muscovite universal state, emerging full-blown in 1478, that intercepted the name Russian (original \textit{Rus’kyi}) and gradually transferred the leadership of East Orthodox civilization from Kyiv to Moscow.

From the split in Christianity in 1054, the Orthodox East (Byzantine and then Russia) and the West, Toynbee maintains, were two distinct civilizations set apart by religion. The ebb and flow of pressures on Russia’s frontiers explains Russia’s development and expansion. The first set of pressures was from the steppe nomads of the East; the second set, from the West – an “aggressive” Western Christianity, then Western technology and liberalism.

“The military and political victory which Russia thus eventually obtained over the West on this Continental European front was offset on the cultural plane by the consequent propagation of Modern Western influences from these semi-Westernized tracts of originally Russian ground into a \textit{Muskovy} which had exposed herself to this Western cultural contamination by wresting one after another of the infected territories out of the hands of their Western conquerors and uniting them politically with a Muscovite citadel of Russian Orthodox Christendom which had never fallen under Western rule.”\footnote{Toynbee considers Russia the victim and the West the “arch-aggressor of modern times”, citing Western invasions in 1610 (Poland and Sweden), 1709 (Sweden), 1812 (Napoleon), 1853 (the Crimean War), 1915 (Germany), and 1941 (Germany). Sometimes he adds foreign intervention in the Civil War (1918) to his list. In short, Russia was the first civilization to confront and respond to the technological challenge of the West (Arnold J. Toynbee, \textit{Civilization on Trial} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948); Arnold J. Toynbee, \textit{The World and the West} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 236).}

\footnote{Ibid., vol. 8, 128.}
The most important single event in this long-drawn-out process, Toynbee concluded, was Muscovy’s acquisition, in 1667, of Kyiv, “the Ukrainian city which had been pre-Muscovite Russia’s political and cultural capital, and which, under Polish rule, had latterly become a powerful transmitting-station for Western cultural influences”\textsuperscript{23}. It was after the transfer of Kyiv from Polish to Muscovite sovereignty that Peter the Great found pliant instruments among this Western-minded Ukrainian gentry and clergy for carrying out his own Westernizing policy. At the same time, besides Poland, this originally Russian but latterly semi-Westernized debatable territory on the continental borderland between Muscovy and the Western world had been the “principal field in which the encounter between Russia and the Western Civilization in its modern form had been taking place down to the time of writing on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1939–45”\textsuperscript{24}. In other words,

“[…] the political sovereignty over ex-Russian territories in which the Modern Western Civilization was gaining these converts was one of the stakes in a fluctuating military contest between a Russian universal state and a succession of Continental European Western Powers”\textsuperscript{25}.

Another was the spiritual factor. Toynbee considered Bolshevism a response to the West. He viewed Marxism as a positive utopian response to the industrialization process that romantics hoped to undo. A powerful ideological weapon against the West, Bolshevism also “served Russia’s need to hold her own against the West economically, in forced marches”\textsuperscript{26}. However, only after the World War II the Soviet Union completed “the political unification”, within its frontiers, of the entire geographical domain of the Ukrainian territory, abating the danger on Russia’s western frontier at same time. This unification strengthened the Soviets and made it possible for them to compete equally with the new Western challenge that the USA posed.

The competition between the USA and the USSR for dominance in the world is discussed in several of Toynbee’s books and articles written after the World War II, including \textit{A Study of History}. Russians, he argued, have an advantage in the competition, because they are not perceived as “American white” and Russification is perceived as a short-out cut to catching up with the West. By contrast, he notes, Russia’s lack of cultural prestige is a disadvantage and will prove to be a formidable obstacle to her attempt to become a universal state, even within her own borders. Russia was never a “middle kingdom” for her neighbours as was China or even eighteenth-century France. Indeed, Russia’s western neighbors, Ukrainians in particular, resisted Russification, because they consider themselves more culturally advanced than Russia. Russia’s best prospects, Toynbee concluded, lay in the backward areas of the world and on her eastern and southern borders\textsuperscript{27}. Thus, in his post World

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Toynbee, \textit{The World and the West}, 128.
\item Ibid., 129.
\item Ibid., 127.
\item Ibid., 135.
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War II writings Toynbee did not object to Ukrainian independence so unconditionally as earlier. The confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union of the Cold War time enabled Ukraine to obtain independence. Toynbee understood this perspective clearly.

**Conclusion.** Toynbee’s interpretation of Ukraine’s position in the world exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of his overall approach. He fits Ukraine into his general scheme of history, which indeed explains important aspects of Ukraine’s development as a region at a crossroads of various cultural and political influences, but ignores those aspects that do not fit into his scheme; these omissions result in some contradictions and distortions. One can suppose that the main reason for this is that Toynbee’s discussion of Ukraine’s past is scattered over the corpus of his works, first of which were written during the World War I and the latest early in 1970s. In accordance with general trends in the world’s politics, Toynbee’s views of Ukraine were changing from recognizing its individuality to interpreting it as a “channel of Western cultural radiation” into Russia and vice versa. Toynbee discerns in Ukrainian history and culture, no less than he does in the history and culture of other states and peoples, what seemed to him clear illustrations of the great impersonal processes that govern the human past. Toynbee as a historian of Ukraine demonstrated naiveté in dealing with a lot of historical facts, but in general respect his discussion of the Ukrainian theme in *A Study of History* was an attempt to introduce Ukraine’s past into the world historical process. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to conclude with the remark that Toynbee helped to acquaint the western public with Ukraine, to shape its positive image in the West.
Важливі аспекти її розвитку, як регіону на перехресті різних культурних та політичних традицій, проте згінорувавши деякі моменти, які не входили у його схему розвитку історії.

Ключові слова: Арнольд Дж. Тойнбі, національність, українці, цивілізація, історична інтерпретація, українське питання.

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